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INTRODUCTORYREMARKS
Today, so many people assert personal liberty, insist on inviolable rights of
individuality, and lay claim to the rights OLDrivacy. When abandoned home disci-
PIine, declining education in the school offensive behaviors of youngsters in the
street, or brutal delinquencies come up in conversation, long discussions of the
personal liberty, individuality, or privacy, never failto follow them. Those claims
based on the individuality, more precisely, on personal liberty seem to be
inevitable elements in order that the moderns may dealwith how to live in the
actual society of today.
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When people discuss this sort of problems, however, we cannot avoid admit-
ting that they apt to take their own modus vimendi(manner or mode of living)
forthe most importantthing, At the same time, they countthemselves as beings
which should be valued most highly in the world. Theseviews have taken many
of modern people in their mind, probably since the end of the WorldWar 11. After
having become disgusted with totalitarian resultsfrom the World War, people in
the countries involved in the War have begun to take a sort of stance mainly
based on the ideas as follows:
"As a matter offact, you should look to the interests of your own country, of
your own race, of your own family, of yourself. That is the most important
thing in life. '
Here arises one question:Whydo riot people seemtobe inclined to argue about
the freedom of the world or the freedom of Nature, but simply the "individual"
freedom?Whyare they led to seek onlyforpersonalfreedoms instead of claiming
the liberty of the terra nestrttas the total ground for the individual freedom?
We can find here some tokens of naked desires caused by assumptive ideas
concerning Nature orthe world. Many of the moderns in the so-called developed
countries seem to take the pursuit of the personal interests for granted and con-
sider that this belongs to the human rights,
CLAIMSTO PERSONALFREEDOMSANDCRISISOFINDIVIDUALITY
While we are living in cotton wool, enjoying seemingly contortable everyday
life with using devices produced by technology (we owe it to highly developed
Natural Sciences), we have feelings that something unfathomable, uncanny and
incomprehensible permeates through the ground of our everyday existence. We
have a hunch that we are now imperceptibly confronted with something alarm-
ing and unidentifiable, something absurd and monstrous in the background of
our everyday existence. So we intuitively sense something extraordinary in the
groundofourown existence.
In sum, weteelourselves drivento avert our eyesfrom that something uniden-
tmable because of the scent of danger in our own ground of existence without
clearawareness of the reality of the danger. Therefore, we are induced to confine
the sphere of OUT concerns to personal matters and talk about "individuality",
"freedom", or "liberty" in order to look to our own safety at least. Thus we lay
loudly claim of the rights of individuality, feeling that we should get rid of the
state of being caught in a trap, which will give rise to the collapse of our own
groundofexistence,
We get an inkling of something veiled, which secretly corrodes the ground of
existence. The corrosion can be found, for example, in case that laws of Nature
are mechanicalIy applied to the feelings, emotions, mind and so on. This sort of
application is practiced because a human being is regarded as a thing under the
subjection of laws of Nature. This way of understanding of human nature might
hilto recognize the essential mode of existence amonghumanbeings and endan-
ger a humanbeing "from his ground of existence up. "
It is an impending crisis of the ground of existence. Its influences however
cannot be limited only to the level of the individual existence, because iridispen-
sable roles of the world and Nature as the essential ground for the existence in
general are set out of sight, seem to become meaningless, and then are brought
out of apparent sphere of remembrance finally. This happens very often when
peoplebegin to think about the problemofthefreedom.
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NATUREAS PLACEANDTIME
Nature as one of the forms of concretely realized "place" is a sort of locus (a
concretized place) where arithe beings come into the existence, meet together,
go on existing, and come to end. Hence, place is merged into happenings and,
time as process of events in Nature is mixed up in those happenings, and, in con-
sequence, with the place, too. That is to saythattime and place in Nature works
at one with each other and it is realized in the midst of coatitt"ting of things.
Without these elements as place and time essential to their own existence, the
existence of arithe beings could not be found tit place and tinre tit means "at
the right place at the right time"), that is to say, concretized in their own reality.
Simply expressed, it could not be properly realized in a certain place and time
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where an coatitt"ting comes to happen.
On the other hand, the world as an indispensable element for the existence of
allthe human beings lets them be as they are. That a being is as it is in a locus
like in the world requires at the same time that it finds itselfin a certain killpus
(a concrete time). In this sense, the existence of human beings is historical
because they find themselves in an coatittuti"9,100e o71d ti?ite. Place and time
are merged into each other antwo elements of human existence, so that they are
concretized and realized as locus and jumptrs through the eventuating of things
in them. Therefore, the mengence o1 place and time shoud be designated more
adequately as "an 008fttuott?39 place and time".(Properly speaking, place and
time are primordialIy not separated from each other. All eventuating event dif-
forenciates into place and time according to the intellectual understanding. )
These things imply that the existence of human beings is not established on a
firinground, butthe ground itselfis moving, orswaying,
That people begin to feelsomething unfathomable in the deep ground of their
existence and become insecure means that they are now aware that the tradi-
tionally given home-ground for the support of individual existence cannot be the
last resort for both an individual existence and the world itself any more since
the declaration of the death of God by MVSCHE, It is to say that the world or
Nature seems to be on the verge of a crisis because of becoming meaningless of
the ground of existence.
As a consequence, the moderns, wintry to support somehow or other their
own individual existence at least by demanding loudly the freedoms of the will of
the individual or the exercise offTee will. In other words, people in the world of
today surely scent the crisis of the world and the individual existence some-
where deep in the mind. Thus, they wintry, without knowing it clearly, to defend
the ground for their own existence against the breakdown of the existence in
general, hdding on to individualistic basis as their last resort. In short the inod-
erns suspect meaninglessness of their own existence in the existentialground of
the world and humanbeings themselves. This feeling seemsto produce an effect
on viewpoints among the modem people and make them feela premonition that
they could notrelyonaTranscendentBeinganymore.
THEABYSSOF NIHILITY^NIHILISM
The absence of a Transcendent Being is a typical manifestation of "nihility"
that erodes the ground of existence. The abyss of "nihility" opens its mouth
from the bottom of arithe existence in the form of the meaninglessness of our
own existence. Most of us in the modern world, however, cannot but avert our
eyes from the fact without awakening to the reality of nihility. In other words,
the reason why we are carving for a solid ground of existence is because we are
not aware of what happens in the innermost ground o10ur existence. Most of the
moderns have been fumbling around for the possibilities of extrication from
falling into the bottomless abyss of meaninglessness of their own existence. They
do riot seek it in any other place than in the personal liberty as freedom of the
will as the last resort.
The meaninglessness as a token of "nihility" has alreadybecome a part of the
existence of modern Ego. Under the circumstances, the Self as a focus of the
activity of an eventuating event shows itself as the modern Ego when it takes
shape through the permeation of self-centeredness. The self-centeredness comes
thus into existence based on nihility since such a Transcendent Being like God
was put out of the sphere of Nature and the world. To demand the personal libefr
ty or the freedom of the will under such circumstances might be a vain attempt
to seek a sanctuary, onlywithin which an individual could feelsecured under the
inusion that he could get his freedom in hand and make his own individuality
positive by himself. People are taken up with the idea that this is the only way to
get rid of the nihilistic crisis of the individual existence. In this way, they keep
themselves from being face to face with the abyss of "nihility" opened up in the
ground of existence ingeneral.
As I mentioned above, the reason why people are carving for the freedom of
the individual is, in my opinion, because people are afraid offinding the absence
of such a Transcendent Being as could give meanings to their existence. Indeed
they are not clearly conscious of the origin of the meaninglessness of their own
being and the world where they lead lives, but they have already noticed that
something unusual is happening somewhere deeply in the bottom of mind andof
existence. Demanding loudly the freedom of the will belongs to a token of mani-
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festation of nihility. The nihility has been in essence permeating deeper and
deeper the ground of the individual existence, the world and Nature from the
beginning of our existence. We cannot possibly get rid of the permeation of nihili-
tyin the ground of existence, rather.
In the modern nihilism, people are brought into confrontation with the mean-
inglessness of their existence from its ground up. Thac is to say that anthe
beings seem to be deprived of the meaning of existence in the present world. It
leads people in an existential extremity to doubt of the ground of their own ads-
tence and finally to an awakening to the erosion of their own existential ground
with the meaninglessness. Thus, the moderns cannot rely on a sort of
Transcendent Being such as God, which was believed to give an existential
ground to anthebeings in the world.
NIHILISM IN THE ORDINARY LIFE
011ate, however, such a supreme being like God is loosing and, probably, has
already lost its position as the origin of the meaning for anthe beings in the
world since the establishment of the modem rationalistic Ego. In other words,
the modern establishment of Ego has deprived a Transcendent Being OILhe role
of the origin of allthe meanings for allofbeings. Instead of the self, which corre-
sponded to the interaction among a human being Nature and a Transcendent
Being according to theories in the medleyal alchemy, modern philosophies and
sciences have set an observing subject in the central place of the world or
Nature, and things in the world as objects to be observed. Under these circum-
stances, the most of modern people are apt to cast aveiloverthe fact of nihilism,
because they have an anxiety that, even If he dared to seek for a secured ground
for his own existence, he could riotfind the root of the existence nor could return
to himself as before. They feel a premonition that nihility invades imperceptibly
Lhe ground and the meaninglessness of being would lead him to his own nihility,
i. e. death.
This is one of the modes of being of the modern rationalistIC Ego as a subject.
It belongs to this type of nihilism that people abandon themselves to the pursuit
of pleasure like gambling, indulging in dissipation, or even in sports. They adapt
themselves to a life of impetuous desires, standing on the meaningless ground of
theirexistence through making themselves blindto the fact of nihilism.
SARTREAND PROJECTION IN CLOSED CIRCUIT
Another type of nihilism can be found in the existentialism of Jean-Paul
SARTRE. For SatLre, "existence" means that there is nothing to rely on either
within the self or without it, and accordingly human existence is grounded on
nothingness and is thrown (seprq?bier)from this nothingness into the actual sit-
uation, Thus, "existence" of humanbeings is intrinsicallybased on nothingness.
In this sense, the existentialism of Sartre can be called "nihilistic". Because the
human existence is based on nothingness, a human being is freed from the
restraints, which are in themselves imaginary and are believed to be caused by
some traditional image of God or a Transcendent Being, and he throws concinu-
ously himselftoward the future. In this manner, he chooses and grasps his own
mode of existence on the ground of nothingness from inside of the situation into
which he is thrown. This is called by Sartre the "freedom of human existence".
Sartre gives his existentialism the name of humorntsm, because the human
being is the subject of his own existence.
Sartre sees through the once veiled fact of the modern nihilism that the
ground of human existence is intrinsicallypermeatedby nihility. We should place
a highvalue on this insight.
According to Sattre, throwing himselfbeyond himself, a inari chooses an exis-
tence for the self. This "throwing himselfbeyond himself" leads to such a mode
of existence that a man finds himself constantly beyond himself. This is the
meaning of "transcendence" to be acquired by human beings. Thus, a human
being chooses Lhe transcending self as an aim of existence beyond himself, I At
the same time, it is not necessary now for him to bring an external ground of
existence such as a Transcent Being into his own ground of existence. In this
sense, Sartre says, "... there is no other legislator than a man ( or humanbeing)
FREEDOMANDNECESSITf
I Cf. I, -P. Sattre: <L'ensigntittltsrne est t, ?, 1/3, muftisme}, p. 92, Edition Nagel,
1970.
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himself. " 2
Sartre's existentialism opts for nihility as the ground of existence with con-
sciousness and decisiveness. His existentialism as humanism comes about oily
within the sphere of human existence, even though he refers to transcendence,
The notion of "transcendence" in his existentialism is nothing but a kind of a
closed-circuit activity of the self- that means an action of throwing the selfinto
a situation and gets itself back from that situation for choice - this action was
described as "throwing and choosing oneselfbeyond oneself". Here is to notice a
kind of abeyond-oneselfback-to-oneselfcirculationwithinthe sphere of his exis-
tential projection. This is just a selfclosed circuit activity of the self, In this
sense, Sartre's standpointisbased on a self-centeredness of humanbeing,
NIHILISM IN NATURALSCIENCE
Modern naturalscience takes on a character of self-centeredness, too. It bases
the so-called scientific view of the world on the character. Though it does not
seem appropriate for natural science to be counted for nihilism, its materialistic
view of the world is closely bound up with such a point of view that being of a
man does not hold an expressly significant position among material things and
can be reduced to matter as something deficient in meaning (materialization of
human being). Thus, natural science may be regarded as an exLreme form of
nihilism. As known, it insists on the strict objectivity of observing objects in
Nature. It seems that natural scientists take it into their head firmly that the
influence of an observing subject can be excluded through and through.
Observation itself, however, would be impossible without the existence of an
observing subject and an object to be observed at the same time at the same
place.
Moreover, we could not derive any results from an observation, nor take them
for signiticant for a theory or a hypothesis without influence from a part of the
2 I, -F, Sartre: op. cit. p. 93-94 : (Humanisme, parce que nous rappelons a I' hornme
qu' it n'y a d' autre legislateur que Iui-meme, at que c' est dans to delaissement
qu' it decidera de Ini-meme. )
subject on the place and time of observation. (There might be probably no obser-
vation without anypurpose such as proving a theory or making assure a hypoth-
esis. )
Atheoryorahypothesisis awayofunderstandingNature and the worldas an
object of an observing scientist, and there we can find a kind of bias through
which we will be able to get recognition of an aspect of Nature or events in
Nature. Through a bias of a theory made by an observing scientist we will meet
such an aspect of Nature that is made to be focused into a certain area of human
knowledge. Observation, therefore, has such a structure that, through throwing
light on to Nature in the frame of man-made theory, an observing subject
receives a reflex of the light returning from Narure. A sort of subjective opera
tion cannot but be intermixed into the reflexive light of observation.
Consequently, observation of naturalscience can never be objective in the sense
of "being never influenced by an observing subject and thereforetrue",
Forexample, WemerK, HEISENBERG(1901-1970, a Germanphysicist, says:
"Ifwe can speak about the picture of Nature in our age, it is not a macter of the
picture of Nature itself, but of the picture of our relationship with Nature. 3 In
this case too, we can find a self-closed-circuit activity of the self such as a
beyond-oneself-back-to-oneself circulation. It maybe said that the world-view of
natural science is constituted of this circulation of an observing human exis-
tence. That is to say, natural science is founded on the self-centeredness of the
(probably "intrinsic") mode of existence of human being, too.
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"SUBJECTIVE" FREEDOM
There is one point at which these three types of nihilistic thought meet on a
common ground. That is a position as concerns the self-centeredness and, there-
fore, a self-centered viewpointfrom whichfreedom can be taken into sight. That
is to say, freedom is apprehended from the viewpoint of the human existence as
a subject in the sense of natural science, that is, within the self-closed-circuit
3 Wemer Heisenberg : "DOS Normrbild der heatiqe?IPhgsik ; p, 21, Rowohlt
Taschenbuch Venag, Hamburg;1955
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activity of the self, Freedom comes to be metby a subject conditioned by its self-
closed mode of being, Because this kind offreedom is freedom as far as it is met
by the subject, thefteedom itselfis conditioned by its mode of being.
Accordingly, this kind of freedom is the freedom of choice among human
activities, such as abandoning oneself to pleasure in case of nihilism without
coming to awareness of its revelation. It leads in most cases to choice of a "Iran-
scendent self" through throwing oneself beyond oneself, like in the existential-
ism of Sadre. It also comes, in effect, to setting an object in Nature in front of an
observing subject and treating the object as raw meterIal which is so reorgan~
ized, reconstructed or reconstituted as the subject will. This is the nature of the
freedom of the will after all.
filthis manner, the freedom of the will is established on the mode of existence
of the subject in the form of being conditioned by the self-closed activity of the
self. In other words, it is based on the mode of existence conditioned by the self-
centeredness. For that reason, we should say it is conditioned by the self-cen-
teredness, too. It is not free from this condition. A humanbeing can never attain
to so-called "absolute freedom" (the absolute freedom means that abeing in the
state of "absolute freedom" is theoretically freed from every kind of restriction
and can behave itself as it will) because it is set in the mode of existence condi-
tioned by the self-centeredness. Where can we find then the realfreedom or lib-
erty?
NISHITANl'S "STANDPOINT OF SUNY;47;A"
In the philosophy of Kent msHITAN1(1900 -1990, based on Zen Buddhism,
the notion OILhe freedom in the ordinary sense is thrown away completely and
he says: "the Teal freedom is beyond being free or not free"4. How can we
understandthis phase?
Nishitanifinds in Sartre' s early thoughts of existentialism one of the forms of
4 Kerii Nishitani "Zen am loombtt (The Standpoint of Zen Buddhism)", p, 74, pub-
lished by Sobut!-sho, Tokyo, 1986,
Keni Nishitani: "Religion o72d Nothi?, gusts" (translated by Jan Van Bragt); pp:
95-96; University of California Press 1982
5
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"subjectivization of nihility in modern atheism"5. It means, firstly, Sartre does
not regard a Transcendent Being as necessary to the existence of human beings,
but Nishitani does so. Secondly, the existentialphilosophy ofSartre holds that it
is possible to dealwith subjectivity only as an awareness of a nihility rising from
the ground of human beings. Contrary to Sartre, Nishitani thinks that this
ground for the awakening lies beyond the reach of human reason. Of the ground
based on the nihility constitutes the veryground on which we stand. In this way,
he tries to find out a positive point in the subjectivization of nihility in modern
atheism, which is one of distinctive characters of thoughts in the contemporary
world.
What makes a distinction between Nishitani' s thought and that o1 Sartre,
however, is that the viewpoint of the Japanese philosopher lies beyond a scope
conditioned by the self-centeredness. His way of thinking goes beyondan arithro-
Docentric sphere. Nishitanielucidates the meaning of nihility that liesjust under
the ground of the existence of humanbeings.
In the philosophy of the standpoint of "suit!/ato. ", the world is not interpreted
as something opposed to a being - chat is, not as absolute nothingness, but as a
relative one - and as something that negates a being, and so makes a being
meaningless. On the contrary, it is regarded as a working place of sunnatd that
breaks through the dimension of a nihility in opposition to a being (i. e. a relative
nothingness) allat once and uncovers an infinite openness at the bottom of nihili-
ty. According to Nishitani, nihilism including existentialism views yet nihility
from the bias of self-being and regards nihility as something opposed to a being
and as something lying outside of a self-being. He explains the intrinsic charac-
ter of nihility as follows:
FREEDOMANDNECESSITY
"The nihility that one becomes aware of at the ground of the self and the
world extends alltheway to the locus of the divine. Nihilism here makes the
claim that onlyby taking a stance on nihility man can truly attain to subjec-
tivity andfreedom. With this subjectivization of the abyss of nihility, a realm
opened up at the ground of the self-existence of inari beyond the pale of the
divine order hitherto considered to be essentially in control of the self, a
realm that allows nothing to preside over it, not even God. Here the autono-
Mathesis Universalis Volume 3, No. 217 5' ?I . * = * = JP"i' U I 3 :48 2 +;'
my of man truly came into being for the first time. (Several passages are
omitted) In spite of this, however, the representation of nothingness in
nihilism still shows traces of the bias of objectification, of taking nothing
ness as some 'thing' called nothingness", 6
Forthis reason, the subjectivity in nihilism has not attained to the subjectivity
in the true form yet. In order that the subjectivity in the true picture maybe real-
ized, we must arrive Ina place, which will be uncovered throughbecoming inarii-
rest of openness(that is another form of $247,110to). This place comes to being only
whenweleave astandpoint on which we meet and recognize things on the basis
of confrontation between being and nihility. The place is called "the field of SUTa-
yattt". In the field of suittjqt", the freedom in the true picture, namely to be truly
free, is to be brought to fruition.
IfLhat is the case, a question comes up as follows: How can the field of suit!/"-
to be brought into an actual situation, or realized? In response to it Nishitani
referstoemptiness in the following way:
"Emptiness in the sense of sunyata is emptiness only when it empties itself
even of the standpointthat represents it as some 'thing' that is emptiness.
It is, in its original Form, self-emptying, In this meaning, true emptiness is
not to be DOSited as something outside of and other than 'being. ' Rather, it
is to be realized as something united to and self-identical with being. " 7
He continues to describe the emptiness further in connection with a notion of
"absolute nothingness".
"Whenwe say 'beingsive-nothingness ' or 'form is emptiness; emptiness
is form, ' we do not mean that what are initially conceived of as being on
one side and nothingness on the other have later been joined together. In
the context of Mahayana thought, the primary principle of which is to tmn-
6 Kerii Nishitani: op. tit. pp: 95-96.
7 KeriiNishitani: op. cit. , pp. 9697.
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scend all duality emerging from logical analysis, the phrase 'being-sire-
nothingness' requires that one take up the stance of the 'sive' and from
there view being as being and nothingness as nothingness. (Several Das-
sages are omitted)It is here that emptiness, as a standpoint of absolute nori-
attachment!foeratedfromthis double confinement, comes to the fore. "8
EMPTYEDSELFINADIALECTICALMOTION
The coining-to~the-fore of emptinessis closely bound up with the mode of exis-
tence of the self, and, therefore, with the issue of the subjectivity in the true
sense. The coining-cothe-fore of emptiness ($317,110t") comes about through the
realization of nihility and so Lhrough realizing the presence of nihility at the
foundation of its existence. This realization of nihility is Do other than the aware-
ness, or rather awakening of inari as a subject to the abyss of nihility. "This
awareness implies more than merely looking contemplativeIy at death and nihili-
ty. " 9 It is also necessary for the self as the subject of action to take nihility upon
itself in order to be awaken to the fact that the self is empty, At the same time
when the subject gets to this awakening, the field of suity"to opens up and it
becomes "the field of ecstatic transcendence of the subject". 10
This is the first turn "from what we ordinarily call 'self' to the field of amity-
ata"11. From here takes place the second turn to the standpoint of suit!/orto, not
as the field of ecstatic transcendence of the subject any more, but as the field of
turning backfrom the ecstatic transcendence to the actuality, that is, to the real-
itIes of life of the subject. This field of suwato is called"the absdute near side"12.
Here happens the turnabout of the mode of existence of the subject from "the
self is empty" to "emptiness is self , too.
The above-mentioned logical evolution maybe explained with using the dialec~
tic terminology: the first turn lies in the direction to the absolute negation of
FREEDOMANDNECESSITY
8 KeniNishitani: op. cit. , p. 97.
9 KeniNishitani: op. cit. , p. 16.
10 KeniNishitani: op. cit. , p, 151.
u KeriiNishitani: op. cit. , p. 151
12 KefjiNishitani: op. ciL. , p. 151
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existence, which negation goes beyond the standpoint of existence to transcen-
dence, and furthermore to the negaLion of nihility itself, which leads to the nega-
tmn of existence. In this direction comes to appear for the first time the
"absolute negativity". Here, then, the subject comes to awakening to "the self is
empty". It might be paraphrased in the following way: "the self is not self but
nothing".
The power of the absolute negation is too dynamic and rushing to stay on the
phase of a static awakening to the self as emptiness. It negates even this awak-
ening further and makes it turn to such an affirmation (as the result of through
the negation of negation) that emptiness is the self. In other words, the power of
absolute negativity brings the ordinary selfback to the first awakening to "'the
self is empty, the self is nothing"13 once again. It was the phase in which the
negation OILhe selfwas carried out. Then, it makes the selfin the form of empti-
ness turn back to the selfthrough negating the first awakening once more:this
phase can be expressed that "emptiness (nothingness)is the self".
In this direction, the first negation of the self is negated once more through
the activity of the absolute negation of emptiness and it becomes an absolute
affirmation. In the direction of the absolute affirmation is met a rebirth of the self
with since it lets the sentake a sudden turnback to the selfinthe realities.
Here should be noted that the first negation does not come to happen apart
from the second one in such awaythatthe second negation results from thenrst
one' The absolute negation comes into play anat once, and that is realized on the
field of sungoto. There, on the field of emptiness the field of the so-called self
the field of self-consciousness, which is, to be seenfromthe root of the existence
grounded ontoe self-centeredness, is brokenthrough.
FREEDOM IN EMPTINESS
What does it mean, "emptiness is the self"? When the self is emptied out
through the activity of emptiness in the direction of the absolute negation the
world as the field of the existence of the self is nullified, At the same time,
13 Keni Nishitani: op. cit. , p. 151.
because the existence of the world and that of things in the world are in unison
with the existence of the self, Nishitanirefers to the ground of our existence and
freedom as follows:
"To say that a thing is not itself means that, while continuing to be itself, it
is in the home-ground of everything else. Figuratively speaking, its roots
reach across into the ground of all other things and helps to hold them up
and keep them standing. It serves as a constitucive element of theirbeing so
that they can be what they are, and thus provides an ingredient of their
being. That a thing is itself means that all other things, everything else is
there too; that the roots of every other thing spread across into its home~
ground. This waythat everything has of being on the home-groundofevery-
thing else, without ceasing to be on its own home-ground, means that the
being of each thing is held up, kept standing, and made to be what it is by
means of the being of all other things; or, put the other way around, that
each thing holds up the being of every other thing, keeps it standing, and
makes it what it is. In a word, it means that alithings 'are' in the 'world. "'14
FREEDOMANDNECESSITY
This relationship between the self and things in the world is called "the cir-
cuminsessional relationship" of things in the field of suityttt". (The self of
humanbeing alsobelongs as an individual person to "things" in the world, )
Emptiness (sungot")is the field in which things become possible to come into
such an existence as they truly are themselves. On the other hand, the world is
opened up as it truly is (itselD by virtue of the opening up of the field of sunyata.
In this sense, the field of $1,712/urn is the home-ground of the self as it truly is,
"the original self in itself' including the self of human beings, of the world, and
of things in the world. Seeing from the standpoint of "the original self in itself',
the self of human beings is at one with that of the world and things. In other
words, the selfis at one with that of Nature or, to put it more shortly, the selfis
at one with Nature. Moreover, it may be said that this at-oneness of the self of
individual human beings with Nature is a result from the activity of absolute
M KeniNishitani: op, cit. , p. 149.
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negation that is concretised as an eventuatingevent.
At the same time, we should refer to the activity of adsdute negation in the
direction of the absolute affirmation concerning the self in itself, In the midst of
the turning back to the self as "emptiness is the self", the original self in itself,
which comes to the fore as an eventuating place and time in unison with the
world and things as the result from the absolute negation, is once more negated.
Untilthis complete negation of incessant recurrence is set in motion, it will not
be free from anthe relationship with the world and things else. The thorough
negation of unceasing recurrence makes it possible for the selfas a certain tern~
Dorary center of activity of negation to manifest itself as this individual self of
"mine", Here in the absolute affirmative turnabout, I can getto enjoying my own
absolute autonomy, gain an absolute subjectivity, and occupy "the rank of mas~
ter seated at the center of everything". 15Thus says Nishitani:
"It maybe said that all of us, as individual human beings, are also 'things'
in the world and that our existence is an illusoryappearanceprecisely as the
truly real beings that they are. And we may then go on to say that where
this being of ours 'is' at an elemental level at one with emptiness, the
world and the totality of things become manifest from our own home-
ground. "16
Nevertheless, one thing should be noted carefully the self in this phase in the
direction of the absolute affirmation is radically (from the ground up) different
from the ordinary self because it has already gone through and is continuing to
go through the absolute negation in the field of suityota. It is cut off from the
root of the adherence to the individuality, and so from the self-centeredness as
the mode of existence of the ordinary self. The self is now absolutely free from
the self-will as the root of the freedom of the will in the sense of arbitrariness, or
of the freedom of choice.
Here should be remembered once again that the absolute negation and affir
15
16
Keni Nishitani: op. cit. , p. 147,
Keni Nishitani: o0. cit. , p. 152.
mation do not come about one after another, but the activity of the absolute
negation on the field of suitg/din gets simultaneously into action all at once.
Therefore, the self in itself comes into play from and on the basis of the at-one-
ness of the selfwith Nature, that is, from and on the home-ground not without
our existence, but within that of ours. From there, the world and the totality of
things come out to manifest itself/themselves. It has the same meaning as the
fact that Nature is at one with the originalself in itself and puts itself in action on
and from the same home-ground of OUT own. IfT may permit myselfto give the
name to the "putting-itselfin-action of Nature" as the "will of Nature",
because this action can be regarded as a form of the will, then the manifestation
of the self of our own is no other than the puttingitself-in-action of Nature. The
will of Nature, therefore, does not differ from the will of OUT own. Here in this
phase we can meet with the origin of "Sullen" in the accordance with the will
of Nature.
FREBDOMANDNECESSITY
SELFAND NATURE;FREEDOMAND NECESSITY
To obey the will of Nature is the same as obeying or accepting the necessity of
Nature. Because this necessity of Nature comes into play on andfrom the home-
ground where the self in itself is at one with the world, or with Nature, the
necessity is not different from the will of the self of our own. On the one hand,
something that comes into play without external help (of itself, or mistiko?, a in
Jap. ) must be defined "free", Consequently, necessity is one and the same as
freedom in the field of suityuio. On the other hand, a free will as something goes
into action without being forced to do so "is" such as it is, and so is of
"nature". 17 Therefore, Nishitani pronounces "nature-sive-freedom" (in this
case, it can be interpreted that Nature is nothing but freedom).:8
In spite of it, to obey or accept the necessity of Nature may be regarded as
"without will(non-will)", because to come into play without help from outside (of
17 Here we try to give an English translation to a Japanese everyday expression
"o1,034!keriu". When we give a very simple and single term to the expression, "of
itself' can be one possible translation.
18 Cf. "zer, ito tonhib"", pp. 137-140.
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its800 means to begin to work by itself or naturally, and we need not force our-
selves to find there the action of the will of an individual being. Viewed from a
different angle, however, obeying or accepting the necessity of Nature can be
seen as the fact that the self on the home~ground of the self in itself, that is, on
the at-oneness with Nature, goes into action without being forced. Accordingly,
accepting the necessity of Nature has an aspect of obeying the win of Narure as
one's own free will. Here we can find the exercise of one' s own will, or the
action of an individual will. Necessity andfreedom are like two sides of the same
coin.
What I mentioned above indicates that the field of sunnato is the innermost
originfromwhere the will and the nonwill, freedom and necessity arise, because
the field of st, ?1310to opens up the home-ground on which the world and the
things, or Nattire, become manifest and the selfofour own attains to the original
self in itself. In this sense says Nishitani: "the true freedom" which is that
home-ground of the originalself in itself "is beyondbeing free and not free. "
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Aboutten years ago, just before IlefcJapan for the United States, Ihad heard
by chance on a TV-news about aJ'21dicio! decision from a high court on a case of
carryingin of salacious writings, briefly, of pornography, The import of the case
is as follows: All editor of a magazine designed to carry in some pornographic
magazines from the U. S. A. into Japan. He was checked at the Japanese
Customhouse, chey were confiscated by the Customs authorities, and, to go a
step further, he was adjudged at the first instance "guilty" and punished with a
fine of an amount of money. He appealed then againstthe decision of the lower
court to a high court persisting in claiming his innocence. Then he was given a
verdict of "not guilty" by the high court. The problem, however, does not lie in
the procedures of the case, butthe contents or the import of the text of the deci-
sion on the case, rather.
Roughly speaking, the tact says: The judgment on whether a deed is obscene
or riot belongs to personal morals, in such a case that obscene goods are used
personally, that is, they serve the purpose of personal(or individual) pleasure,
- 6-
And ajudicialcourt should nottakepart in this area, in personal morals, but only
in a illegal act. Therefore, a judgment concerning the deed of the editor should
not havebeenformed in light of the law.
The sentence seems to be very reasonable. It is quite proper that the court
makes differencebetween the freedom of the individual and the freedom asfaras
the law permits. The notions offreedom in the sentence are almost equivalent to
those of the freedom in the ordinary social lives. However, the author asks him~
self about the following question: From what ground should the difference be
considered andacknowledged?
The individual is considered to have the independent consciousness and this
consciousness is thought to be originally free from arithe restrictions from out-
side, to be sure. But the freedom of the individual or the personal liberty finds
acceptance under the condition that the employ of the personal liberty is
restricted when it usurps on the freedoms of others, because the others are to be
justly dealt with on an equal footing.
If everyone yields himself up to desires co make the limitless employ of the
individual freedom or personal liberty, it will cause conflicts in the society as a
gathering of the individual. Therefore, the employ of the personal liberty should
be restricted in the name of the law, as long as it brings trouble to others (as well
as oneselO. Here we can find the double structure, so to speak, of the freedom;
the freedom of the individual and that as far as the law permits. In short, it may
be said that the individual, independent consciousness and the freedom on the
base of the individual consciousness is the starting point of considering the free-
doin not only in the field of the law, but also in the ordinary lives.
However, after having closely examined the home-ground offreedom and
necessity, we cannotfind contentment in the above mentioned understanding of
freedom. We can find the ground of freedom and necessity merely in the inces-
sarit activity from selfto selfthrough absolute negation, The negation will be car
Tied out simply in the standpoint of emptiness, that is to say, absolute nothing
FREEDOMANDNECESSITY
ness.
To believe that freedom is grounded on the individual consciousness, however,
shows that such a kind of freedom is based on the self-centeredness of human
being. The reason is that the ground of the personal liberty itself and that of the
- 7-
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individual consciousness rests on the same, self-centered basis in the following
way: The incessant negation of the selfon the standpoint of suituttt" comes to a
stop and the activity of absolute negation is set in a standstill. The standstill sup-
plies the ground for the way of thinking that things are to be taken from the
standpoint of a fixed self. Then both the personal liberty and the self-conscious-
ness are regarded as something fixed and substantial. Here begins the self-cen-
tered perspective. The same thing can be applied to the social self such as the
one emerged, for example, in the field of ajudicialworld.
On the contrary, the freedom on the ground of nihility or the home-ground
from the standpoint of suwat" is freed from the self-centeredness, because the
standpoint is consisted of the incessant negation of the self. More exactly the
selfis nothing but the unceasing activity of negation of the absolute nothingness.
Only in the midst of the continual activity of the self-negation of the absolute
nothingness, OUT self/selves finds a historico!!DCtts in place and in time, at the
righttime at the rightplace, as the ground of existence.
Because the ground is based on the unceasing motion of absolute negation our
self/selves has possibilities of getting free from the adherence to the once estab-
lished, therefore, fixed ground of existence. This ground based on the incessant
activity of the absolute negation is, in author's view, the home-ground orthe prt-
inordialform of the freedom. The ground for freedom of course, including that
for the personal liberty, cannot be attained untilthe selffrees itselffrom the self-
centered ground through setting itself in the midst of continual activity of the
absolute negation on the standpoint of sungoto.
